Given how other times are just special cases of other universes, **there is no difference between the differences that exist among the same individuals across the multiverse (excluding fungible universes) and the differences within the same individual at different times in a universe.
Taking this further, the same individual is as different from any other non-fungible instances of himself as with any other individuals in his universe, from the perspective of exhibited value scales. Put differently, self-identity is no stronger than the identity between any two people. Knowledge is what keeps you the same epistemologically—and also keeps others the same as well, from the perspective of exhibited value scales.
The non-copiability principle doesn’t necessarily hold across the multiverse, as universes can exist that are perfectly identical to each other. But to the extent that explanatory knowledge must evoke the multiverse (as the former is implied in the latter), other universes must be different for such evocation to be meaningful. As such, the same (or more precisely, fungible) universes per se wouldn’t matter—they matter only because they can differentiate.
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Related:
- Habit is knowledge that keeps you the same epistemologically
- Fungible universes matter only because they can differentiate