Get the key few factors right. Douglas Hofstadter’s quote. (p. 24)
Backups (redundancy), breakpoints (weakest links), critical mass (the more is different) (p. 25)
The Golden Rule again (p. 26)
Lord Peter Wimsey’s quote on quotes (p. 26)
Patience and slight difference in returns make for huge difference when compounded, so get both (p. 27)
Rousseau on real wisdom (p. 28)
relate with Sherlock
George Santayana: to understand is to know what to do (p. 28)
relate with leaning is about changing behavior memos and notes.
Wisdom is about how to use knowledge (p. 28)
relate with Naval.
Munger on extreme success (p. 29)
focus on few variables, non-linear returns, extreme performance, big wave.
…..
Masterplan implies expectations (p. 37)
the Golden Rule >>> self-serving bias (p. 38)
Munger indirectly preaching the importance of having win-win relationships (p. 38)
win-win might materialize in time, and isn’t necessarily instantrevisit
Who invented factor investing? A broker? (p. 39)
To quick profits, reply with quick no (p. 40)
Self-serving bias of others must be considered. Otherwise you are a fool. (p. 40)
Beware hammer-syndrome with creators of a tech (p. 41)
relate with don’t associate yourself with an idea or a tech notes
Again, whose bread I eat, his song I sing (p. 41)
Bevelin on investment letters
On “independent” board, board of directors (p. 41)
“Include me out” (p. 42)
Postpone yes, and say no sooner (p. 42)
Natural progression, the three I: Innovators, Imitators, Idiots (p. 43)
relate with Pierce and Everett
also with what the wise do in the beginning the fools do in the end memos
On bubble. On boom and bust. People dance thinking they can leave right before midnight, but the problem is that the clock has no hands (p. 43)
An originally sound premise turns to focused solely on the price action (p. 43)revisit
always test and recalibrate your thesis (not limited to investment)
Bad ideas are born good. It’s easy to push a really good idea to wretched excess. (p. 44)
relate with environments change notes
relate with check the implication from deviation between the price quotations (the portfolio structure) and the underlying business operation (the plan structure) memos
relate with I was too ahead of my time type excuse memos and notes
The crazy greed, the crazy leverage, the crazy delusions. “The more it changes the more it’s the same thing.” (p. 44)
It’s not the bad idea but a good one carried to excess that do you in (p. 44)
On fretting on leveraged financial institutions. (p. 55)
relate with how being conservative can make look Berkshire losing money 99 times out of 100, but in the crucial one time Berkshire is designed to survive
this was mentioned in founders #380,
as discussed elsewhere, it’s the weakest link which gets hit (e.g., see pp. 54-55).
Low expectations, humor, friends and family (p. 57)
Interest rate independent (p. 58)
because interest is subjective phenomena and how Berkshire operates has nothing to do with natural rate of interest…revisit
margin of safety is there to avoid ruin. on that one time out of 100. (pp. 58-59)
relate with the same memos
relate with Ray Dalio’s uncorrelated bet and Berkshire’s diverse businesses holding
Usually when the time is right the credit is tight. Have loaded gun. (p. 59)
Shakespeare quote on the black swan event (p. 61)
relate probability notes with black swan notes
Be wary of low probability events in financial arena than natural arena (p. 61)
because knowledge is subjective and created subjectively it’s more wild than nature.revisit
Work with people who understand the Lucretius problem (p. 61)
Margin of safety is related with the black swan (p. 62)
And again, watch out for the weakest link (e.g., customers and suppliers) because if they go down it might hurt you (p. 62)
Relate with give it time and distance yourself notes (p. 64)
Improving yourself >>> penalizing others. (p. 65)
relate with stupidity notes
Envy is simply negative-sum, rule it out (p. 66)
You can fool people some of the time but not forever; when you get old you’ll get the reputation you deserve (p. 67)
relate with the portfolio structure catching up to the plan structure memos and notes
People just don’t see how much money there is in being honest (p. 67)
Munger was at Salomon? (p. 67)
A great reputation is like virginity (p. 67)
relate with falsification notes
Sol Price: success in business comes from deciding which business you can intelligently do without (p. 68)
inversion at play
relate with membership memos and Sol Price notes
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer (munger was at the military office as well?) (p. 69)
Teach with what you do, not what you say (p. 69)
relate with seeing the front notes
Peer pressure on the young is far more important (p. 70)
relate with concentric learning notes and culture notes
It pays to hang around with people better than you are because you’ll float upward a little bit. Bad company corrupts good character (p. 70)
relate with the five average notes
It’s nice to be important, but more important to be nice (p. 70)
relate with notes on being nice
You’ll meet a lot of people you initially think they are one-stops but they aren’t (p. 71)
relate with second order effect notes
Deliver what you would buy if you were in the other end (p. 71)
relate with other similar quotes and notes from munger
Success is getting what you want and happiness is wanting what you get (p. 71)revisit
Be lovable. You always get back more than you give away. If you don’t give any you want get any. (p. 71)
Ben Graham and the list of unattractive qualities in other people (p. 71)
inversion at play
Show up on time; don’t steal credit; don’t cut corners; avoid envy (p. 71)
Find, emulate, and associate with good people (and good businesses) (p. 72)
Remember Grant McFayden, he didn’t need a lawyer (p. 72)
Read Rules for Making Oneself a Disagreeable Companion, by Ben Franklin (pp. 72-73)
Passion is not the sufficient factor, but likely necessary for success (p. 73)
relate with Kobe Bryant quote and absence of evidence notes
There’s no substitute for strong interest (p. 73)
Munger’s three basic rules: don’t sell anything you wouldn’t buy yourself; don’t work for anyone you don’t respect and admire; work only with people you enjoy (p. 74)
relate with previous memo on deliver what you would buy if you were on the other side
Particularly avoid working directly under somebody you don’t admire and don’t want to be like. Maybe you have to keep doing it to keep eating for a while but don’t settle for it. You just go out and find somebody else. (p. 74)
Make yourself a person that you would want to hire. Trustworthiness is more important than brains. (p. 74)
The best knows that they are playing their game (p. 74)
130 IQ guy who thinks he’s 125 >>> 180 IQ guy who thinks he’s 200 (p. 76)
the size of the circle doesn’t matter, and this is the true sense when Munger (or Buffett) says “it’s not competency if you don’t know the edge of it” (find related memos and notes).revisit
Real knowledge is knowing one’s ignorance, Confucius (p. 77)
The shoe button complex (p. 77)
relate with how being successful in one area doesn’t translate to other areas automatically notes.
Planck knowledge >>> chauffeur knowledge (p. 78)
relate with imitation notes
Beware the articulate incompetent (p. 78)
also beware the twaddler (p. 78)
relate with humans can do stupid things note.
it’s not really that people get pushed out until their aptitude fails to qualify for whatever the new position; he simply has to study what’s required for capital allocation (p. 79)
Relate stupid people notes and pigs (p. 81)
Buffett version of surround yourself with better people (p. 81)
relate with similar notes
When you have doubts about a person, you can pass. There are many other nice ones to interface with (p. 82)
On trust (p. 83)
no matter how many contracts you sign, the bad actors will find ways
relate with black swan
relate this with Bitcoin and smart contract notes.revisit
On decentralization and no second guessing (p. 84)
Leave them alone, and treat them they you would like to be treated if the role is reversed, the Golden Rule again (p. 85)revisit
Lack of oversight means we miss some things but overall it is a benefit (pp. 86-87)
relate with long term thinking memos and notes.
Culture, not rule books, determines organizations (p. 87)
All I want to know is if there are any factors that can cause ruin, and if any never go there (p. 132)
Understand the downside five to ten years from now (p. 132)
relate with Amara’s law.
Fact check quote #1098 (p. 132)
Is the upside worth it? If not worth doing it, don’t (p. 132)
On Napoleon’s mother (p. 133)
part iii
investment is business of capital allocation (p. 134)
on zero and negative interest rates (pp. 135-136)
check the timeline of quotes
investment is about the return, when, and how sure you are (p. 136)
what is smart at one price is dumb at another (p. 137)
outstanding business at sensible price >>> mediocre business at bargain price (p. 137)
when it’s cheap you’ll be able to tell just like you can tell if someone is fat or old without knowing the specific number (p. 138)revisit
the decision should be obvious (p. 138)
get rich slow (p. 139)
really good opportunities aren’t often and won’t last long (p. 139)
you get paid for being right (p. 140)
relate with naval
on bull market and sex (p. 141)
human behavior (of others) allows for success if you are able to detach yourself emotionally (p. 141)
on fear and greed as unpredictable diseases (p. 142)
horse and auto industry (p. 142)
relate with other memo
you can’t differentiate luck and shrewd decision (assuming there’s a difference). And there’s a background of preparation behind it, which is also not visible (‘p. 143)
relate with knowledge and performance notes
there are mispricings (p. 143)
relate with there is no objective mispricing memos and notes
deprival-superreaction tendency—Belridge Oil example (pp. 143-144)
ask: what doesn’t change with crypto (e.g., Bitcoin and ETH)?revisit
the law of least effort >>> change (p. 147)
relate with loss aversion notes
the meaning of understanding a business. Risk is from not understanding what you’re doing. (pp. 147-148)
relate with the first quote in /Buffett
this applies to anything (e.g., poker)
You need the moat and the knight who can widen the moat. (p. 148)
Personal thought: having a moat challenges the basic economic assumption of competition (p. 149)
Pick (or be) the low-cost producer (p. 149)
E.g., GEICO, The Nebraska Furniture Mart (p. 150)
Just take care of the customers (p. 151)
E.g., ISCAR (p. 151)
Sam Walton’s quote on the customer (p. 151)
relate with consumer sovereignty notes.
Never abuse current clients by trying to get new ones. (p. 151)
relate with iteration notes,
the general rule here applies elsewhere in life
Eliminate what irritates the customer (p. 152)
this is inversion in play.
The Daily Racing Form, Reed-Elsevier (pp. 152-153)
Transportation and energy are essential (p. 153)
remember DS
Berkshire’s energy businesses holding is composed such that all are recession resistant and uncorrelated and can withstand regulatory attack.
Moat of railroad companies is saturation (p. 154)
Homes, auto, and insurance are essential. (p. 154)
Have a special place on people’s mind then you can raise the price (p. 154)
relate with DMU notes and symbol (or association) notes
Pricing power implies essentially. Look at the pricing behavior of the product (not the stock). (p. 154)
Get the basics well. You don’t have to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary results, don’t get diverted and instead focus on what works. (p. 155)
You should’ve shorted horses instead of buying up autos. Ask: who loses? (p. 156)
Can you name any single American TV or radio manufacturer? (p. 156)
Growth in an industry doesn’t mean profitability because of competition (p. 157)
relate with tiptoe memo and notes (emergent disorder)
Munger on Facebook (lol) (p. 157)
Business ≠ industry (p. 158)
relate with individuals ≠ society memos and notes
Business ≠ franchise. Many operations are in between weak franchise and strong business. (p. 158)
Dead fish won’t swim how hard you try proverb (p. 159)
relate with Marc Andreessen memos and notes again
Permanent problem ≠ temporary setback. Differentiate the two. (p. 159)
Bad news—if you see one, usually there’s more (p. 159)
relate with sloppy one thing likely means sloppy elsewhere memos and notes, and anything else related (e.g., bad news is easy to detect and likely gets exaggerated notes)
Share of mind >>> share of market (p. 160)
You rarely get poor investing in utilities (p. 160)
Good business throws up one easy decision after another (p. 162)
In commoditized businesses, you can’t really differentiate yourself (p. 162)
Get attractive security in attractive industry (p. 162)
Tech is based on change; and change is the enemy of the investors (p. 163)revisit
Ask: can I compete and hurt a business with a billion dollars? (p. 164)
a business should be attack-prone
Andy grove and silver bullet question (p. 164)
I wish I didn’t know now what I didn’t know then quote (p. 165)
relate with what’s not worth doing memos and notes
Retailing is competitive (p. 165)
On retailing (e.g., Costco and Amazon) (p. 165)
Pay attention to mistakes of omission, and learn from them (p. 167)
relate with absence of evidence notes
Check the track record of Berkshire’s investments (p. 168)TODO
small mistakes are fine—it’s about payoff (p. 168)
acknowledging and analyzing errors >>> agonizing over errors (p. 169)
Ask: is this a good (or bad) business? Why? (p. 169)
Buffett’s quote on reality centered cast of mind (p. 169)
The company should be viewed as an unfolding movie, not a still snapshot (p. 171)
The story of an ailing horse, again. Ask: is the business for sale because it’s walking just fine? (p. 171)
Mar Twain: a mine is a hole in the ground owned by a liar. (p. 172)
Buffett and Keynes on business is success is about future, not past. And you also have to explain why the business was successful in the past. (pp. 172-173)
relate with tracing the origin notes and quote from Paul valery
Ask: what forces can stop the current ongoing success? (p. 173)
Ben Franklin: a small leak will sink a great ship (p. 173)
relate with small changes can go unnoticed until too late notes
ABCs of business decay: arrogance, bureaucracy, and complacency. “Whom the gods want to destroy, they send forty years of success” (p. 174)
Businesses die. Sometimes better to just get out. Remember the Northern Pike Model (e.g., Walmart vs other chains). (pp. 176-177)
Stop digging. Fight wishful thinking, consistency bias, and loss to aversion bias. Stop wasting resources (e.g., time). Get out leaking vessels. (p. 177)
relate with biases notes
You don’t have to make it back the way you lost it (p. 178)
relate with money abstraction notes and method-independent notes (how doesn’t matter)
Businesses are bought for keeps (p. 178)
With stocks and bonds, if we find something more attractive, we sell (p. 178)
relate with opportunity cost notes
Not price but value is what matters with investment. (p. 178)
Organization foolish in one way is likely foolish in other areas (p. 179)
relate with sloppy in one area memos and notes
We just find people who’ve batted .350 for 10-50 years. We don’t train them. (p. 179)
relate with the decision should be obvious memos and notes
You can’t put passion into someone, but it’s easy to take it away. Don’t do that. (p. 180)
Work with winners. Remember Eddie Bennett and Yankees. (p. 180)
Being good at one thing doesn’t mean you’ll be good at another (p. 181)
relate with sloppy in one area memos (as a counter?)
don’t do things you know you can’t do. stick with what you’re good at. know your game and that of others—play the former, and not the latter. (pp. 182-183)
relate with naval’s quote and relate note on redefining the game
allocate your time according to your talent (p. 182)
relate with DMU (diminishing marginal utility) notesrevisit
just pick weak competitions (p. 183)
get in the right train, and why “idiots” can get rich (p. 184)
relate with marc andreessen’s emphasis on being in the right business
buy good businesses run by good people in good places. macro headlines don’t matter—does macro headline affect your decision on marriage? (p. 186)
no rainbow without a cloud or a storm (p. 187)
relate with being greedy when others are fearful
On dot-com bubble and on changing expectations given the available facts, and why thinking like businessmen helps because often what’s been speculated is absurd. (pp. 188-189)
relate with quotes from /Holmes
the statement here clearly shows Buffett’s view that the Portfolio Structure will reflect the underlying Plan Structure
does Lachmann share the same view?
can the Portfolio Structure change the Plan Structure not temporality or on surface but substantially?
I think it does and that’s what happens in case of malinvestment caused by fiat money printing by the government
if so, what’s the implication for Buffett’s view?revisit
roughly right >>> precisely wrong (p. 189)
common sense >>> computer models (p. 189)
you shouldn’t need a spreadsheet to decide (p. 190)
relate with decision should be obvious memo from (p. 138) above
people calculate too much and think too little (p. 190)
relate with what counts often cannot be counted
it’s not a competency if you don’t know the edge of it (p. 192)revisit
on one or few factors. less is often more. (p. 192)
Sandy Gottesman (p. 193)
write down your investment decision, preferably in a paragraph (p. 193)TODO
investing is about finding a mispriced gamble, and you have to know enough to decide if it’s mispriced (p. 194)
the statement here implies that nothing is objectively mispricedrevisit
relate with there is no such thing as mispricing note and refine it to there is no such thing as objectively mispricedTODO
Mr. Market >>> PnL (p. 195)
to be more precise, when your measurement criteria is PnL, then Mr. Market might dictate yourevisit
relate with other memos and notes elsewhere—you want to use Mr. Market, never to be used
the playing field (the Plan Structure) >>> scoreboard (the Portfolio Structure) (p. 196)
not where the puck is, but where it’s going (p. 196)
relate with price is fundamentally about future notes
risk is loss of purchasing power (p. 197)
why does Buffett not invest in Bitcoin?
simple stuff is generally overlooked (p. 197)
relate with simple stuff might not spread fast memo
questions to ask when investing (p. 197)
best time to get rick is in a crisis. independent thinking, financial preparation, and mental preparation. it doesn’t take brains (although you need the right basic ideas)—it takes temperament. (p. 198)
relate with cash is the gun to hunt rare fast-moving elephants memo
part iv
get rid of the nonsense fast. if you know it’s nonsensical then don’t even think about it. (p. 201)
when it’s too simple it might not spread fast. (p. 202)
narrow it down to the important and knowable. (p. 203)
relate with solve important problems note
circle of competence is about knowing your limit (p. 203)
it’s more epistemological concept than I initially thought
you mix raisins and turds, you still get turds (p. 205)
mistakes are forgotten and successes are exaggerated—revisit past decisions (p. 206)
relate with media notes
relate with biases notes
get the no-brainers off the desk fast (p. 207)
do this both in big picture stuff as well as when facing a problem (i.e., approach no-brainer parts first)
edward tuft quote (p. 207)
it’s about personal opportunity costs, and since your value scale changes, you have to reevaluate your opportunity costs all the time (pp. 208-209)
relate with value scales change notes
relate with recalibration notes
the more you know, the higher the bar—but remember to stay within your circle of competence (p. 209)
this is implied in personal opportunity costs argument, and also in value scales notes (particularly, how what you don’t know cannot be in your value scale note)
relate with it-gets-easier notes
relate with how nothing is evaluated independently by us memo (p. 18)
relate with munger’s comment on li lu
do with what’s available (p. 210)
similar in spirit with concentric circle (how children acquire languages) note
that is, you have to widen your circle of competence (i think you can replace this with conception of reality) reflexively
comparing new opportunities against what’s available is the same in spirit to asking at night how what you’ve learned that day relates to what you already know (p. 211)
the goal is to make the best choice at that point in time, and not the best choice ever, because the world is in flux (p. 211)
Hall of Shame—not just about what didn’t work, but also what could’ve been done, that is, counterfactuals (p. 212)
ask: then what? (p. 213)
you can’t do merely one thing—this is principle both in ecology and legislation (p. 214)
parade-tiptoe problem (p. 215)
in spirit this is spontaneous disorder phenomenon—but you can avoid this if you think through
on Gresham and pejoristic system (p. 216)
don’t fool yourself (p. 217)
you truly communicate when trying to fool someone—because you must think really hard about what the counterpart is thinking
inspired by 福本伸行’s カイジ (mentioned in コテンラジオ: ペリー編)
look at the corporate cemetery (p. 218)
opportunity cost filter + compared to what filter + then what filter (p. 219)
you have to think in terms of available alternatives, and the possible consequences of each alternativerevisit
you have to figure out the multiverse—relate this with idea maze notes
checklists are no substitute for thinking, but powerful (p. 221)
always surprise the enemy (p. 221)
relate with black swan notes and surprise notes
personal thought: war, history, and ideas evolve by reconfiguration—you will lose if you associate yourself too strongly with specific configurationrevisit
A Few Lessons for Investors and Managers from Warren Buffett – Peter Bevelin
1.
Investment is about cash (p. 1)
And return (p. 1)
relate return is about how much and when and surety, as well as comparable ones.
return matters in comparison with other possible returns
return per se doesn’t matter—it’s all about opportunity cost and choosing the best option
2.
Because it’s all about cash, the business specifics don’t matter (p. 2)
relate with money abstraction notes.
Work so the a range of possibilities (p. 3)
relate with evolution and could’ve been notes.
Intrinsic value approach is the only logical approach (p. 3)
3.
Bond /= equity (p. 4)
relate with MES notes, also revisit Ayache’s argument on CBs.
Book value doesn’t matter, it’s per-share intrinsic value that matters (p. 4)
any investment (intrinsic value calculation) must be calculated using its excess in comparison with some other possible investment (p. 5)
Div yield, PER, PBR, growth rates, etc per se don’t matter (p. 5)
Discounted-flows-of-cash is what matters. Volatility doesn’t matter. (p. 6)
Always subtract capex (p. 6)
relate with capital per se is not permanent note.
Earnings is arbitrary (p. 6)
there is no objective number.
Know what to measure, otherwise you might end up making up the number (p. 7)
4.
Goodwill is that excess mentioned in (p. 5) capitalized (pp. 8-9)
Return on invested capital depends on sales, cost, and the amount of capital required (p. 9)
5. business characteristics
inverted: don’t invest in companies signaling DMU
inverted: pricing power is essential in inflationary environment
consumer franchise is the key to pricing power, not production cost
a business can be killed by poor management—a franchise can withstand poor management (p. 15)
cost becomes irrelevant only in the ERE—in reality cost does matter because most people don’t know better
since cost is about opportunity costs, it’s rooted in individual knowledge—and that is subjective
a. really great
Being the low cost producer or having the brand can function as barrier to entry for others (p. 11)
Try to compete with that business in your mind (p. 11)
relate with argue better than against your own idea better than the opponent memos and notes.
Ask: does it have any close substitute? (p. 11)
relate with anything can be substituted notes.
The best protection against inflation is a great business (p. 11)
Businesses needing not much in tangible assets are hurt the least by inflation (p. 12)
See’s had minimized need for tangible assets (operating funds) because it was sold for cash and production cycle was short so didn’t have inventory issues (p. 12)
relate with iteration notes.
Reputation creates value for See’s (and not production cost) and is the source of goodwill (p. 13)
Ask Microsoft or Google (p. 13)
relate with infinite leverage memos and notes
b. good
c. the gruesome
sugar isn’t differentiated (p. 15)
unless someone does it
Nothing fails like success (in commoditized businesses) (p. 16)
in commoditized businesses, individually economic decision isn’t economic at all when considered collectively (p. 17)
only consumers enjoy the benefits of the product—but remember that the capital were better invested elsewhere—ultimately, no one really benefits in DMU environment (i.e., in no knowledge creation environment)
if the division of capital relates to creating different production process, then the more is different might be true in significant sense—the more connection and configuration might indeed imply new knowledgerevisit
Get out leaking boat (p. 19)
relate with Marc Andreessen memos and notes.
Inversion would be: leave unpromising battlefield.
Turnaround seldom turn and usually takes longer (p. 19)
relate with it takes longer and costs more memos and notes
d. other tough businesses
Tech is usually unpredictable, and only few will win big (p. 21)
relate with think probabilistically notes.
growth has its limits (p. 21)
e. on accounting goodwill
Ch. 5-E is about the difference between a good business and a good purchase
it clearly states how a company with good Plan Structure doesn’t necessarily mean a good one to have in your Portfolio Structurerevisit
his emphasis to exclude Goodwill when evaluating the business makes sense especially in light of Lachmann’s framework—because only then can the analysis clearly captures the soundness of the company’s Plan Structurerevisit
Buffett meets Lachmann
but when you are buying the business as an investment, then relevant return is within the framework of Portfolio Strucure—here, what matters is how much you actually paid for the expected returns—amortizing Goodwill is like pretending you only partially paid for the business each year
6. past results
personal thought—housing bubbles in tokyo reminds me of ones which led to GFC (p. 27)
relate the following with the network effect: survival of the fattest (p. 29)
have fun, then it will compound, then you widen the moat (p. 31)
7. trustworthy mgmt
personal thought: who’s allocating the capital for us? (p. 34)
personal thought: the Portfolio Structure must account for the management ability in managing the Plan Structure (i.e., capital allocation skill—the management’s skill in managing the Plan Structure includes their ability to manage the Portfolio Structure). (p. 34)revisit
inverted: can the Control Structure be made such that the Portfolio Structure directly corresponds to the Plan Structure?revisit
is this where smart contracts can make a difference?
can you integrate smart contracts into Bitcoin (e.g., OP_CAT)?revisit
9. corporate governance
skin in the game (p. 39)
in buffett’s owner-capitalism, the Control Structure (directors—取締役) should be aligned with the Portfolio Structure (owners—株主) (p. 40)revisit
directors ≠ managers
the former functions as a check on the latter (社長/CEO) power—on daily basis the latter decides company matters
10. owners and mgmt
on “marriage” between owners (the Portfolio Structure) and managers (the Plan Structure) (p. 41)
incentives work regardless of the scale
“hire well, manage little” code
follow the Golden Rule
relate with relativity notes (e.g., imagine being in the other’s shoe note)
on managers’ mindset (p. 42)
on what counts, and not how it’s counted
11. compensation
at Berkshire, mgmt (i.e., Buffett and Munger) has the same interest as owners (shareholders). (p. 43)
an option holder has no downside risk, hence will not be a part of good incentive structure (p. 46)
ask: is the current incentive structure “capricious”?
ask: would rewarding XXX based on YYY’s performance capricious?
12. mergers and acquisitions
Demonstrated consistent earning power >>> projection or turnaround (p. 48)
Again, always think about the alternatives (e.g., passive investment) (p. 49)
Again, per-share intrinsic value >>> reported number (p. 50)
it’s the same with fundamental >>> price quotations, or knowledge >>> looks, just that you have to guess for all of the former due to its subjective nature.revisit
Often the acquisitions benefit everyone except the shareholders of the acquirers (p. 51)
relate with activists memos
Per-share progress >>> size (p. 51)
Why not buy in market? (p. 51)
In a trade what you give up is as important as what you get (p. 52)
Markup what’s been given up as well, if that thing is undervalued don’t markup arbitrarily, let alone marking up the target stock while leaving your issued shares at market price. (p. 52)
If not worth selling at all, then it’s not worth even a small part of it (p. 53)
relate with if not worth doing well it’s not worth doing at all memos and notes
The don’t-give-up-more-than-what-you-get rule applies for any transactions (p. 53)
Deals never fail in projections (p. 54)
relate with other notes (e.g., Sherlock, Deutsch)
Earnings simply don’t move smoothly. (p. 54)
The story of the man with an ailing horse (p. 55)
relate with independent thinking memos and notes
13. few mgmt issues
imitation has a limitation (p. 56)
relate with singleton quote
no yo-yo approach—do what makes sense for the customers (p. 59)
remember that the latter is the general condition of the multiverse
ignore Mr. Market as necessary (p. 77)
Mr. Market is there to serve me, never to guide me (p. 78)
operating results >>> price quotations (p. 78)
this makes sense because any amount of money can do the job of moneyrevisit
also makes sense because here the emphasis is on the soundness of the Plan Structure
in the short-run the market is a voting machine wherein you only need money—in the long-run the market is a weighing machine (p. 78)
personal thought: in the long-run, the Portfolio Structure will reflect the Plan Structure—just that you have to stay in the game.revisit
but how (and why) does the long-run kick in? does this have to happen necessarily? is focusing on what’s necessary somewhat meaningless given the general condition of the multiverse is change? maybe the rule of thumb is enough here?revisit
maybe the ABCT does offer why this happens necessarily—but doesn’t ABCT have its own problems?revisit
rockefeller emphasized the quality of information over speed
build business around what you do naturally
you wouldn’t know if a guy who hits .300 is good or not unless there’s some background knowledge
the same applies to American corporations and their histories (29m)
not buying Belridge because munger didn’t have “enough” cash (32m)
not paying attention to what other people think should apply to investment (i.e., to price quotations) (35m)
Jeff Bezos story on Amazon’s stock price going down from 103to6
share what’s important to you
Variance in listed companies’ CEOs ≠ that of Olympic team. So if you find good ones stick with them, because they are rare.
relate with knowledge is rare notes
Isadore Sharpe doubling down on ads when everyone was cutting it down because they saw it as a cost.
You teach something, then they will come directly to you to offer something. Be individual opportunities driven, just like Napoleon was. Projects >>> plan.revisit
Be easy to interface with (49m)
Think about and focus on what counts for the business, and eliminate everything else.
Specialization = focus = play your game (53m)
e.g., Todd Graves (chicken fingers guy)
If you’re not sure if it’s your game, it likely isn’t. Know your circle of competence.
On internet (59m)
Billy Durant (of GM)—he was in horse carrying business initially
Learning is about changing your behavior.
Buffett with Belridge Oil, Intel, Disney, and Amazon.
Stay in the game long enough so lucky stuff happens—invention of new tech can somehow benefit you (1h5m)
e.g., marginal MLB players’ compensation went up because of TV (because the stadium got bigger with TV—spectator size went from 40k to the whole country), Coca Cola and fridge, Rockefeller and Ford.
if you keep changing your game you wouldn’t notice theserevisit